Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Norman, Thomas W. L.
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.005
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 610-627
• 关键词: replicator dynamics; evolutionary stability; continuous strategy spaces; Stable sets

摘要

Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze [Bomze, I., 1990. Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability. Monatsh. Math. 110, 189-206] and Oechssler and Riedel [Oechssler, J., Riedel, E, 2001. Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces. Econ. Theory 17, 141-162] provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.