Rapid evolution under inertia

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Norman, Thomas W. L.
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.002
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 865-879
• 关键词: evolution; mutations; Long-run equilibrium; Waiting times; inertia; switching costs

摘要

This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes m x m pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in the presence of switching costs, due to the creation of new absorbing states that allow Ellison's [Ellison, G., 2000. Basins of attraction, long-run stochastic stability, and the speed of step-by-step evolution. Rev. Econ. Stud. 67, 17-45] step-by-step evolution to occur. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.