First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Monteiro, Paulo Klinger
• 署名单位: Getulio Vargas Foundation
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.024
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 256-269
• 关键词: First-price auction; Independent private values; Symmetric equilibria

摘要

In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the independent private values, first-price auction for any distribution of valuations. The equilibrium strategy is a pure strategy at the continuity points of the distribution and bids a mixed strategy at the discontinuity points of the distribution. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.