Multi-battle contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; Free University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.05.002
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 256-274
• 关键词: All-pay auction; Contest; RACE; CONFLICT; Multi-stage; R&D; Endogenous uncertainty; preemption; Discouragement

摘要

We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium analytically and demonstrate that it exhibits endogenous uncertainty. Even a large lead by one player does not fully discourage the other player, and each feasible state is reached with positive probability in equilibrium (pervasiveness). Expected effort in the component contests may be non-monotonic in the closeness of the race and realized individual effort may exceed the value of the prize by a factor that is proportional to the maximum number of stage victories required. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.