Informational externalities and emergence of consensus
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas
署名单位：
Tel Aviv University; Universite Paris 13; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.027
发表日期：
2009
页码：
979-994
关键词：
摘要：
We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus. These results imply extensions of many known results in the literature of social learning and getting to agreement. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.