Price-quantity competition with varying toughness

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: d'Aspremont, Claude; Ferreira, Rodolphe Dos Santos
• 署名单位: Universite Catholique Louvain; Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.03.001
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 62-82
• 关键词: Oligopolistic equilibrium; Competitive toughness; Price-quantity competition; market share; Market size; Kinked demand; Cournot-Bertrand debate

摘要

For an industry producing a single homogeneous good, we define and characterize the concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, allowing for a parameterized continuum of regimes with varying competitive toughness. This parameterization will appear to be equivalent to the one used in the empirical literature. The Cournot and the competitive outcomes coincide, respectively, with the softest and the toughest oligopolistic equilibrium outcome. The concept offers an alternative to the conjectural variations approach with better foundations. It can be viewed as a canonical description of oligopolistic behavior which can receive different theoretical justifications and provide a convenient tool for modeling purposes. Two illustrative cases (linear and isoelastic demands) are developed and the possibility of endogenizing (strategically) the choice of competitive toughness by the firms is examined. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.