A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ozyurt, Selcuk; Sanver, M. Remzi
• 署名单位: Istanbul Bilgi University; New York University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.026
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 880-892
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; manipulation; Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; social choice correspondences; Hyperfunctions

摘要

A social choice hyperfunction picks a non-empty set of alternatives at each admissible preference profile over sets of alternatives. We analyze the manipulability of social choice hyperfunctions. We identify a domain D-lambda of lexicographic orderings which exhibits an impossibility of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite type. Moreover, this impossibility is inherited by all well-known superdomains of D-lambda. As most of the standard extension axioms induce superdomains of D-lambda while social choice correspondences are particular social choice hyperfunctions, we are able to generalize many impossibility results in the literature. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.