Bargaining over bets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
• 署名单位: Brown University; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.001
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 78-97
• 关键词: Speculative trade; mechanism design; Bets; Pre-game contracts; non-common priors; optimism

摘要

When two agents hold different priors over an unverifiable state of nature, which affects the outcome of a game they are about to play, they have an incentive to bet on the game's outcome. We pose the following question: what are the limits to the agents' ability to realize gains from such speculative bets when their priors are private information? We apply a mechanism design approach to this question. We characterize interim-efficient bets and discuss their implementability in terms of the underlying game's payoff structure. In particular, we show that as the costs of unilaterally manipulating the bet's outcome become more symmetric across states and agents, implementation becomes easier. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.