Congestion games with malicious players

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Babaioff, Moshe; Kleinberg, Robert; Papadimitriou, Christos H.
• 署名单位: Microsoft; Cornell University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.017
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 22-35
• 关键词: Selfish routing; Malicious behavior; equilibrium; Congestion games

摘要

We study the equilibria of non-atomic congestion games in which there are two types of players: rational players, who seek to minimize their own delay, and malicious players, who seek to maximize the average delay experienced by the rational players. We study the existence of pure and mixed Nash equilibria for these games, and we seek to quantify the impact of the malicious players on the equilibrium. One counterintuitive phenomenon which we demonstrate is the windfall of malice: paradoxically, when a myopically malicious player gains control of a fraction of the flow, the new equilibrium may be more favorable for the remaining rational players than the previous equilibrium. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.