Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roy, Sunanda; Sabarwal, Tarun
• 署名单位: University of Kansas; Iowa State University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.006
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 337-353
• 关键词: Global stability; Adaptive dynamics; Strategic substitutes; Dominance solvable; learning; monotone comparative statics; Correspondence principle

摘要

In games with strategic substitutes (GSS), convergence of the best-response dynamic starting from the inf (or sup) of the strategy space is equivalent to global stability (convergence of every adaptive dynamic to the same pure strategy Nash equilibrium). Consequently, in GSS, global stability can be analyzed using a single best response dynamic. Moreover, in GSS, global stability is equivalent to dominance solvability, showing that in this class of games, two different foundations for robustness of predicted outcomes are equivalent, and both can be checked using a single best response dynamic. These equivalences are useful to study stability of equilibria in a variety of applications. Furthermore, in parameterized GSS, under natural conditions, dynamically stable equilibrium selections can be viewed in terms of monotone selections of equilibria. Several examples are provided. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.