Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heller, Yuval; Solan, Eilon; Tomala, Tristan
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 222-234
• 关键词: cheap-talk; communication equilibrium; Normal-form correlated equilibrium; Distributed computation

摘要

This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.