Dynamic coordination with individual learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dasgupta, Amil; Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.005
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 83-101
• 关键词: coordination; global games; learning; common knowledge; delay

摘要

We study coordination in dynamic global games with private learning. Players choose whether and when to invest irreversibly in a project whose success depends on its quality and the timing of investment. Players gradually learn about project quality. We identify conditions on temporal incentives under which, in sufficiently long games, players coordinate on investing whenever doing so is not dominated. Roughly speaking, this outcome occurs whenever players' payoffs are sufficiently tolerant of non-simultaneous coordination. We also identify conditions under which players coordinate on the risk-dominant action. We provide foundations for these results in terms of higher order beliefs. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.