Comparative statics of altruism and spite

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Milchtaich, Igal
• 署名单位: Bar Ilan University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.015
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 809-831
• 关键词: Altruism; selfishness; comparative statics; strategic games; Static stability

摘要

The equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction may depend on the weight players place on other players' payoffs or, more generally, on some social payoff that depends on everyone's actions. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or complete selfishness, respectively. As it turns out, even in a symmetric interaction the equilibrium level of social payoff may be lower for a group of altruists than for selfish or spiteful groups. In particular, a concern for others' payoffs may paradoxically lower these payoffs. However, this can only be so if the equilibrium strategies involved are unstable. If they are stable, the social payoff can only increase or remain unchanged with an increasing degree of altruism. In these results, 'stability' stands for a general notion of static stability, which includes a number of established ones, such as evolutionarily stable strategy, as special cases. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.