Asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Friedman, Eric J.
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.009
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 139-151
• 关键词: Cost allocation; axioms; Path mechanisms; incentives

摘要

We describe the construction and analysis of asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms, in which a variety of axioms are applied to subsets of the agents/goods. We show that the analysis can be quite subtle as apparently similar axiomatizations lead to significantly different results; in particular, combinations of symmetric mechanisms can be extremely asymmetric and biased. In addition, we characterize some interesting mixed mechanisms. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.