Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nieken, Petra; Schmitz, Patrick W.
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.011
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1000-1008
• 关键词: repeated moral hazard; Sequential hidden actions; laboratory experiment

摘要

This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.