Iterated regret minimization: A new solution concept

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Halpern, Joseph Y.; Pass, Rafael
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.012
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 184-207
• 关键词: Regret minimization; Solution concepts

摘要

For some well-known games, such as the Traveler's Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional game-theoretic solution concepts-most notably Nash equilibrium-predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. We introduce a new solution concept, iterated regret minimization, that exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many games of interest, including Traveler's Dilemma, the Centipede Game, Nash bargaining, and Bertrand competition. As the name suggests, iterated regret minimization involves the iterated deletion of strategies that do not minimize regret. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.