Robustness against indirect invasions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: van Veelen, Matthijs
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.010
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 382-393
• 关键词: Evolutionarily stable strategy; Neutrally stable strategy; Neutral mutant; Direct invasion; Indirect invasion; Robust against indirect invasions; Robust against equilibrium entrants; Evolutionarily stable set; Replicator dynamics; Asymptotically stable; Stochastic dynamics; Moran process; Fixation probability

摘要

Games that have no evolutionarily stable strategy may very well have neutrally stable ones. (Neutrally stable strategies are also known as weakly evolutionarily stable strategies.) Such neutrally, but not evolutionarily stable strategies can however still be relatively stable or unstable, depending on whether or not the neutral mutants it allows for - which by definition do not have a selective advantage themselves - can open doors for other mutants that do have a selective advantage. This paper defines robustness against indirect invasions in order to be able to discern between those two very different situations. Being robust against indirect invasions turns out to be equivalent to being an element of a minimal ES set, where this minimal ES set is the set that consists of this strategy and its (indirect) neutral mutants. This is useful, because we know that ES sets are asymptotically stable in the replicator dynamics. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.