Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: van den Brink, Rene
• 署名单位: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.04.001
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 344-348
• 关键词: Cooperative TU-game; EFFICIENCY; Collusion neutrality; Null player property; Communication graph; Hierarchical outcome

摘要

In the literature various axiomatizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf value can be found where the only difference is the Shapley value satisfying efficiency and the Banzhaf value satisfying collusion neutrality. Both properties seem to be desirable. In this paper, we show that there is no solution satisfying efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. After that we show that this impossibility is resolved when cooperation among players is restricted by a cycle-free communication network such that only connected coalitions are feasible. In particular, all hierarchical outcomes introduced by Demange (2004) and their convex combinations satisfy these three properties. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.