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作者：Bierbrauer, Felix; Brett, Craig; Weymark, John A.
作者单位：University of Cologne; Mount Allison University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：Tax competition between two governments who choose nonlinear income tax schedules to maximize the average utility of their residents when skills are unobservable and labor is perfectly mobile is examined. We show that there are no equilibria in which there is a skill type that pays positive taxes to one country and whose utility is larger than the average utility in the other country or in which the lowest skilled are subsidized. We also show that it is possible for the most highly skilled to ...
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作者：Kushnir, Alexey
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：Several labor markets, including the job market for new Ph.D. economists, have recently developed formal signaling mechanisms. We show that such mechanisms are harmful for some environments. While signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. In particular, we consider a two-sided matching game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Each worker has either the same typical known preferences with...
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作者：Miettinen, Topi
作者单位：Hanken School of Economics
摘要：I analyze how informal agreements can be sustained by moral emotions with regard to a large class of two-player games. Specifically, I assume that people feel guilty if they breach an agreement and that the guilt increases according to the degree of the harm inflicted on the other. A central insight is that it is easier to sustain efficient informal agreements if actions are strategic complements than if they are strategic substitutes. I complement this general insight by studying two specific...
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作者：Pearson, Matthew; Schipper, Burkhard C.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed-bid auctions with symmetric independent private values and 400 participants, we collected information on the female participants' menstrual cycles and the use of hormonal contraceptives. We find that naturally cycling women bid significantly higher than men and earn significantly lower profits than men except during the midcycle when fecundity is highest. We suggest an evolutionary hypothesis according to which women are predisposed by hormo...
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作者：Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel A.
作者单位：ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We propose a rule of decision-making, the sequential procedure guided by routes, and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalently understood as special cases of this rule. In addition, the sequential procedure guided by routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related. We show that choice with a status quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees, which, in turn, is also a refinement of sequential rationalizabilit...
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作者：Bajoori, Elnaz; Flesch, Janos; Vermeulen, Dries
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：Simon and Stinchcombe distinguish two approaches to perfect equilibrium, the trembling hand approach, and the finitistic approach, for games with compact action spaces and continuous payoffs. We investigate relations between the different types of perfect equilibrium introduced by Simon and Stinchcombe. We also propose an improved version of the finitistic approach, and prove existence. Despite the fact that the finitistic approach appeals to basic intuition, our results specifically Examples ...
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作者：Condorelli, Daniele
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：A number of identical objects is allocated to a set of privately informed agents. Agents have linear utility in money. The designer wants to assign objects to agents that possess specific traits, but the allocation can only be conditioned on the willingness to pay and on observable characteristics. I solve for the optimal mechanism. The choice between market or non-market mechanisms depends on the statistical linkage between characteristics valued by the designer and willingness to pay. (C) 20...
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作者：Fischbacher, Urs L.; Utikal, Verena
作者单位：University of Konstanz; University of Erlangen Nuremberg
摘要：An apology is a strong and cheap device to restore social or economic relationships that have been disturbed. In a laboratory experiment in which apologies emerge endogenously, we find that harmdoers use apologies in particular if they fear punishment and if their intentions cannot be easily inferred. After offenses with ambiguous intention punishment for apologizers is lower than for non-apologizers. Victims expect an apology and punish if they do not receive one. An apology does not help at ...
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作者：Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study resource allocation with multi-unit demand, such as the allocation of courses to students. In contrast to the case of single-unit demand, no stable mechanism, not even the (student-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm, achieves desirable properties: it is not strategy-proof and the resulting allocation is not even weakly efficient under submitted preferences. We characterize the priority structure of courses over students under which stability is consistent with strategy-proofness...
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作者：Mierendorff, Konrad
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：We study the efficient allocation of a single object over a finite time horizon. Buyers arrive randomly over time, are long-lived, and have independent private values. The valuation of a buyer may depend on the time of the allocation in an arbitrary way. We construct an incentive compatible mechanism in which (A) there is a single financial transaction (with the buyer), (B) ex-post participation constraints are fulfilled, (C) there is no positive transfer to any agent and (D) payments are dete...
