On the acceptance of apologies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fischbacher, Urs L.; Utikal, Verena
• 署名单位: University of Konstanz; University of Erlangen Nuremberg
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.003
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 592-608
• 关键词: Apology; intentions; experiment

摘要

An apology is a strong and cheap device to restore social or economic relationships that have been disturbed. In a laboratory experiment in which apologies emerge endogenously, we find that harmdoers use apologies in particular if they fear punishment and if their intentions cannot be easily inferred. After offenses with ambiguous intention punishment for apologizers is lower than for non-apologizers. Victims expect an apology and punish if they do not receive one. An apology does not help at all after clearly intentionally committed offenses. On the contrary, after such offenses an apology strongly increases punishment compared to remaining silent. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.