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作者：Hummel, Patrick
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：I consider a model in which candidates of differing quality must win a primary election to compete in the general election. I show that there is an equilibrium in which Democrats choose liberal policies and Republicans choose conservative policies, but higher quality candidates choose more moderate policies than lower quality candidates. In this equilibrium, higher quality candidates choose more moderate policies if they have a larger quality advantage or there is less uncertainty about the me...
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作者：Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Hellman, Ziv; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：Universidade de Santiago de Compostela; Tel Aviv University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Leicester
摘要：Assuming a 'spectrum' or ordering of the players of a coalitional game, as in a political spectrum in a parliamentary situation, we consider a variation of the Shapley value in which coalitions may only be formed if they are connected with respect to the spectrum. This results in a naturally asymmetric power index in which positioning along the spectrum is critical. We present both a characterization of this value by means of properties and combinatoric formulae for calculating it. In simple m...
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作者：Csapo, Gergely; Muller, Rudolf
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We study the problem of finding the profit-maximizing mechanism for a monopolistic provider of a single, non-excludable public good. Our model covers the most general setting, namely, we allow for correlation in the signal distribution as well as for informational externalities in the valuations. We show that the optimal deterministic, ex-post incentive compatible, ex-post individual rational mechanism can be computed in polynomial time by reducing the problem to finding a maximal weight closu...
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作者：Creane, Anthony; Ko, Chiu Yu; Konishi, Hideo
作者单位：University of Kentucky; National University of Singapore; Boston College
摘要：We examine a firm that can license its production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs. We show that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint profit under weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the industry. A jointly profitable transfer may reduce social welfare, although a jointly profitable transfer from the most efficient firm always increases welfare. We also consider two auction games under complet...
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作者：Triossi, Matteo
作者单位：Universidad de Chile
摘要：This paper presents a strategic model of common value elections with endogenous information acquisition. It proves that majoritarian elections can fail to aggregate information when voters have heterogeneous skills and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for information aggregation. Inefficiencies can be partially corrected by limiting participation to the most competent citizens, a result which provides a rational foundation for epistocratic government. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rig...
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作者：Dai, Yun; Gryglewicz, Sebastian; Smit, Han T. J.; De Maeseneire, Wouter
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Vlerick Business School
摘要：When bidders in a corporate takeover have related resources and post-acquisition strategies, their valuations of a target are likely to be interdependent. This paper analyzes sequential-entry takeover contests in which similar bidders have correlated private valuations. The level of similarity affects information content of bids and bidding competition. Our model predicts that expected acquisition prices and the probability of multiple-bidder contests are the highest for intermediately similar...
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作者：Juarez, Ruben
作者单位：University of Hawaii System
摘要：Every agent reports his willingness to pay for one unit of a good. A mechanism allocates goods and cost shares to some agents. We characterize the group strategyproof (GSP) mechanisms under two alternative continuity conditions interpreted as tie-breaking rules. With the maximalist rule (MAX) an indifferent agent is always served. With the minimalist rule (MIN) an indifferent agent does not get a unit of the good. GSP and MAX characterize the cross-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms are ap...
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作者：Klein, Nicolas
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：This paper analyzes a two-player game of strategic experimentation with three-armed exponential bandits in continuous time. Players play bandits of identical types, with one arm that is safe in that it generates a known payoff, whereas the likelihood of the risky arms' yielding a positive payoff is initially unknown. When the types of the two risky arms are perfectly negatively correlated, the efficient policy is an equilibrium if and only if the stakes are high enough. If the negative correla...
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作者：Kreindler, Gabriel E.; Young, H. Peyton
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：Stochastic best response models provide sharp predictions about equilibrium selection when the noise level is arbitrarily small. The difficulty is that, when the noise is extremely small, it can take an extremely long time for a large population to reach the stochastically stable equilibrium. An important exception arises when players interact locally in small close-knit groups; in this case convergence can be rapid for small noise and an arbitrarily large population. We show that a similar re...
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作者：Lang, Matthias; Wambach, Achim
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; University of Cologne
摘要：Most insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast to the previous literature on costly state verification, which has shown that it is optimal to commit to an auditing strategy. The credible announcement of thoroughly auditing claim reports is a powerful deterrent. Yet, we show that uncertainty about fraud detection can be an effective strategy to deter ambiguity-averse agents from reporting false insurance claims. If, in addit...
