Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kojima, Fuhito
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.005
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1-14
• 关键词: Matching; market design; STABILITY; strategy-proofness; EFFICIENCY; priority; acyclicity; Essential homogeneity

摘要

We study resource allocation with multi-unit demand, such as the allocation of courses to students. In contrast to the case of single-unit demand, no stable mechanism, not even the (student-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm, achieves desirable properties: it is not strategy-proof and the resulting allocation is not even weakly efficient under submitted preferences. We characterize the priority structure of courses over students under which stability is consistent with strategy-proofness or efficiency. We show that stability is compatible with strategy-proofness or efficiency if and only if the priority structure is essentially homogeneous. This result suggests that efficient allocation under multi-unit demand is difficult and that the use of stable mechanisms may not deliver desirable outcomes. (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc.