Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Condorelli, Daniele
• 署名单位: University of Essex
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.008
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 582-591
• 关键词: Non-market mechanisms; rationing; mechanism design

摘要

A number of identical objects is allocated to a set of privately informed agents. Agents have linear utility in money. The designer wants to assign objects to agents that possess specific traits, but the allocation can only be conditioned on the willingness to pay and on observable characteristics. I solve for the optimal mechanism. The choice between market or non-market mechanisms depends on the statistical linkage between characteristics valued by the designer and willingness to pay. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.