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作者：Wright, Julian
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：An experiment is designed to provide a snapshot of the strategies used by players in a repeated price competition game with a random continuation rule. One hundred pairs of subjects played the game over the Internet, with subjects having a few days to make their decisions in each round. Occasionally subjects are asked to enter one-period-ahead pricing strategies instead of prices. According to the elicited strategies, between 90% and 95% of subjects punish less harshly (in their initial respon...
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作者：Dziubinski, Marcin; Goyal, Sanjeev
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Warsaw; University of Cambridge
摘要：Infrastructure networks are a key feature of an economy. Their functionality depends on the connectivity and sizes of different components and they face a variety of threats, from natural disasters to intelligent attacks. How should networks be defended and designed to ensure the best functionality? We develop a model to study this question. There are two players, the Designer and the Adversary. The Designer forms costly links among n given nodes and chooses to protect some of them at a cost. ...
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作者：Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C.
作者单位：Open University Israel; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized No-speculative-trade theorem according to which there cannot be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we prove a generalization of...
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作者：Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Korea University; Humboldt University of Berlin; Korea University
摘要：We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that awards a limited number of unrestricted licenses to those firms that report the highest cost reductions, combined with royalty licenses to others. Firms' messages are dual signals of their cost reductions: the message of those who win an unrestricted license signals their cost reduction to rival firms, while losers' messages influence the royalty rate set by the innovator. We explain why a sufficiently high threshold level for awar...
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作者：Jaramillo, Paula; Kayi, Cagatay; Klijn, Flip
作者单位：Universidad de los Andes (Colombia); Universidad del Rosario; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium outcomes can be unstable. We prove that any stable matching is obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set...
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作者：Lahkar, Ratul; Seymour, Robert M.
作者单位：KREA University; IFMR - Graduate School of Business (GSB); University of London; University College London
摘要：We study reinforcement learning in a population game. Agents in a population game revise mixed strategies using the Cross rule of reinforcement learning. The population state the probability distribution over the set of mixed strategies evolves according to the replicator continuity equation which, in its simplest form, is a partial differential equation. The replicator dynamic is a special case in which the initial population state is homogeneous, i.e. when all agents use the same mixed strat...
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作者：Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R.
作者单位：University of Exeter; University of Haifa
摘要：Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs. In this paper, we find an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is benevolent. While the designer cannot charge agents, he can receive a costly but wasteful signal from them. We find conditions for cases in which ignoring these costly signals by givin...
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作者：Xiao, Erte
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Punishment typically involves depriving violators of resources they own such as money or labor. These resources can become revenue for authorities and thus motivate profit-seeking punishment. In this paper, we design a novel experiment to provide direct evidence on the role punishment plays in communicating norms. Importantly, this allows us to provide experimental evidence indicating that if people know that enforcers can benefit monetarily by punishing, they no longer view punishment as sign...
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作者：Foerster, Manuel; Grabisch, Michel; Rusinowska, Agnieszka
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have yes or no inclinations on some issue, and opinions may change due to mutual influence among the agents. Each agent independently aggregates the opinions of the other agents and possibly herself. We study influence processes modeled by ordered weighted averaging operators, which are anonymous: they only depend on how many agents share an opinion. For instance, this allows to study situations where the influence process is based on major...
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作者：Babaioff, Moshe; Blumrosen, Liad; Schapira, Michael
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：In the presence of self-interested parties, mechanism designers typically aim to implement some social-choice function in an equilibrium. This paper studies the cost of such equilibrium requirements in terms of communication. While a certain amount of information x needs to be communicated just for computing the outcome of a certain social-choice function, an additional amount of communication may be required for computing the equilibrium-supporting payments (if exist). Our main result shows t...
