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作者：Moulin, Herve; Velez, Rodrigo A.
作者单位：Rice University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：A buyer procures a network to span a given set of nodes; each seller bids to supply certain edges, then the buyer purchases a minimal cost spanning tree. An efficient tree is constructed in any equilibrium of the Bertrand game. We evaluate the price of imperfect competition (PIC), namely the ratio of the total price that could be charged to the buyer in some equilibrium, to the true minimal cost. If each seller can only bid for a single edge and costs satisfy the triangle inequality, we show t...
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作者：McKinney, C. Nicholas, Jr.; Van Huyck, John B.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：This paper investigates the possibility that people discover effective heuristics when playing similar perfect information games of varying complexity. We call this discovery experience Eureka Learning. We use a change-point analysis to identify 35 percent of our subjects as Eureka Learners. (c) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Faillo, Marco; Grieco, Daniela; Zarri, Luca
作者单位：University of Trento; University of Verona
摘要：In dealing with peer punishment as a cooperation enforcement device, laboratory studies have typically concentrated on discretionary sanctioning, allowing players to castigate each other arbitrarily. By contrast, in real life punishments are often meted out only insofar as punishers are entitled to punish and punishees deserve to be punished. We provide an experimental test for this 'legitimate punishment' institution and show that it yields substantial benefits to cooperation and efficiency g...
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作者：Mazali, Rogerio; Rodrigues-Neto, Jose A.
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：We analyzed the market for indivisible, pure status goods. Firms produce and sell different brands of pure status goods to a population that is willing to signal individual abilities to potential matches in another population. Individual status is determined by the most expensive status good one has. There is a stratified equilibrium with a finite number of brands. Under constant tax rates, a monopoly sells different brands to social classes of equal measure, while in contestable markets, soci...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Jensen, Martin Kaae
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Birmingham
摘要：In aggregative games, each player's payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players. Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics, and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games. This paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games. We focus on two classes of games: (1) aggregative games with strategic substitutes and (2) nice aggregative games, where payoff funct...
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作者：Andersson, Tommy; Erlanson, Albin
作者单位：Lund University
摘要：Assuming that bidders wish to acquire at most one item, this paper defines a polynomial time multi-item auction that locates the VCG prices in a finite number of iterations for any given starting prices. This auction is called the Vickrey-English-Dutch auction and it contains the Vickrey-English auction [Sankaran, J.K., 1994. On a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem. Math. Soc. Sci. 28, 143-150] and the Vickrey-Dutch auction [Mishra, D., Parkes, D., 2009. Multi-item Vi...
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作者：Chen, Yan; Katuscak, Peter; Ozdenoren, Emre
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We investigate gender differences and menstrual cycle effects in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values in a laboratory setting. We find that women bid significantly higher and earn significantly less than men do in the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding or earnings in the second-price auction. Focusing on the first-price auction, we find that, while the gender gap in bidding and earnings persists over the ...
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作者：Sebastian Pereyra, Juan
作者单位：Colegio de Mexico
摘要：This paper inspires from a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of Public Education. We introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. From one period to another, teachers can either retain their current positions or choose a preferred one. In this framework, a solution concept that conciliates the fairness criteria with the individual rationality condition is introduced. It is then proved that a solu...
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作者：Capraro, Valerio; Scarsini, Marco
作者单位：University of Southampton; Singapore University of Technology & Design
摘要：Although mixed extensions of finite games always admit equilibria, this is not the case for countable games, the best-known example being Wald's pick-the-larger-integer game. Several authors have provided conditions for the existence of equilibria in infinite games. These conditions are typically of topological nature and are rarely applicable to countable games. Here we establish an existence result for the equilibrium of countable games when the strategy sets are a countable group, the payof...
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作者：Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
作者单位：Aarhus University
摘要：We study the implementation problem when players are prone to make mistakes. To capture the idea of mistakes, Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium (LQRE) is used, and we consider a case in which players are almost rational, i.e., the sophistication level of players approaches infinity. We show that quasimonotonicity, a small variation of Maskin monotonicity, and no worst alternative are the necessary conditions for restricted Limit LQRE (LLQRE) implementation. Moreover, these conditions are suff...
