Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bajoori, Elnaz; Flesch, Janos; Vermeulen, Dries
• 署名单位: Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.002
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 490-502
• 关键词: Strategic form games; perfect equilibrium; Compact action spaces

摘要

Simon and Stinchcombe distinguish two approaches to perfect equilibrium, the trembling hand approach, and the finitistic approach, for games with compact action spaces and continuous payoffs. We investigate relations between the different types of perfect equilibrium introduced by Simon and Stinchcombe. We also propose an improved version of the finitistic approach, and prove existence. Despite the fact that the finitistic approach appeals to basic intuition, our results specifically Examples 3 and 4-seem to imply a severe critique of this approach. Further examples illustrate the relations between the two approaches and the relation to admissibility of strategies. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.