Choice by sequential procedures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel A.
• 署名单位: ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.09.006
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 90-99
• 关键词: Individual rationality; bounded rationality; behavioral economics

摘要

We propose a rule of decision-making, the sequential procedure guided by routes, and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalently understood as special cases of this rule. In addition, the sequential procedure guided by routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related. We show that choice with a status quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees, which, in turn, is also a refinement of sequential rationalizability. Thus, we provide a sharp taxonomy of these choice models, and show that they all can be understood as choice by sequential procedures. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.