Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pearson, Matthew; Schipper, Burkhard C.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.008
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1-20
• 关键词: Hormones; Menstrual cycle; GENDER; Fecundity; Contraceptives; pill; First-price auction; Risk behavior; COMPETITION; Bidding; Endocrinological economics

摘要

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed-bid auctions with symmetric independent private values and 400 participants, we collected information on the female participants' menstrual cycles and the use of hormonal contraceptives. We find that naturally cycling women bid significantly higher than men and earn significantly lower profits than men except during the midcycle when fecundity is highest. We suggest an evolutionary hypothesis according to which women are predisposed by hormones to generally behave more riskily during their fecund phase of their menstrual cycle in order to increase the probability of conception, quality of offspring, and genetic variety. We also find that women on hormonal contraceptives bid significantly higher and earn substantially lower profits than men. This may be due to progestins contained in hormonal contraceptives or a selection effect. We discuss how our study differs from Chen et al. (2013). (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.