Promises and conventions - An approach to pre-play agreements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miettinen, Topi
• 署名单位: Hanken School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.002
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 68-84
• 关键词: Partnerships; CONTRACTS; Pre-play communication; social norms; Guilt

摘要

I analyze how informal agreements can be sustained by moral emotions with regard to a large class of two-player games. Specifically, I assume that people feel guilty if they breach an agreement and that the guilt increases according to the degree of the harm inflicted on the other. A central insight is that it is easier to sustain efficient informal agreements if actions are strategic complements than if they are strategic substitutes. I complement this general insight by studying two specific cases where negotiators face uncertainty about the breach of the agreement. I show that while the optimal agreement in a game with strategic substitutes must compromise on surplus-maximization and efficiency, the optimal agreement in a game with sufficiently strong strategic complements tends to maximize both the surplus and the probability of compliance especially if the game is symmetric. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.