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作者：De Magistris, Enrico
作者单位：Cornerstone Research
摘要：I propose a notion of Rationalizability, called Incomplete Preference Rationalizability, for games with incomplete preferences. Under an appropriate topological condition, the incomplete preference rationalizable set is non -empty and compact. I argue that incomplete orderings can be used to model incomplete information in strategic settings. Drawing on this connection, I show that in games with private values the sets of incomplete preference rationalizable actions, of belief -free rationaliz...
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作者：Maxey, Tyler
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：I study a model of centralized school choice in which students engage in costly search over schools before submitting preference reports to a clearinghouse. I consider three classes of preferences over schools-idiosyncratic, common, and hybrid-and characterize outcomes under two search protocols-simultaneous and sequential. With idiosyncratic preferences, there are no search externalities, and inefficiencies arise only because of uncoordinated search. Common preferences, however, generate sear...
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作者：Gradwohl, Ronen; Jelnov, Artyom
作者单位：University of Haifa; Ariel University
摘要：We study a repeated credence goods market in which experts provide treatment to customers. We assume that the history of transactions is recorded on a review platform that contains information only about treatments, and not about non-treatments. We also introduce the notion of a partial credence good, where treated customers receive a noisy, ex post signal about the necessity of treatment. Absent such signals, there is a breakdown of the market. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition ...
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作者：Romm, Assaf; Roth, Alvin E.; Shorrer, Ran I.
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Stanford University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Stability and no justified envy are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility constraints, and contracts, and show that stable allocations may admit justified envy. When choice functions are substitutable, the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is both stable and admits no justi...
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作者：Haimanko, Ori
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We prove the existence of a behavioral -strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all -pay auctions with statistically interdependent types (signals) under quite general assumptions on the values, costs and tie -breaking rules. Moreover, the set of equilibria is shown to be the same for any tie -breaking rule used in the auction.
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作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Serena, Marco
作者单位：Tulane University; CUNEF Universidad
摘要：In multi-battle team contests with pairwise battles, how battles are organized-sequentially or (partially) simultaneously-may affect the expected winner's total effort ( WE ), a natural objective in R&D races, elections, and sports. We focus on noise (modeled via the contest success function's discriminatory power) and across-team heterogeneity, abstracting from player-specific heterogeneity. With sufficient noise, we show that: (1) If teams are symmetric, all temporal structures yield the sam...
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作者：Bos, Iwan; Marini, Marco A.; Saulle, Riccardo D.
作者单位：Maastricht University; Sapienza University Rome; University of Padua
摘要：This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set solution concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria when capacities are large or small. For an intermediate range of capacities, it predicts a price interval that includes the mixed-strategy support. This stability c...
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作者：Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Bonifacio, Agustin G.
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Universidad Nacional de San Luis
摘要：In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. First, we show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in t...
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作者：Sirguiado, Camilo J.; Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo
作者单位：Universidad de Chile
摘要：In two-sided one-to-one matching markets, each side of the market has a single stable mechanism that is strategy-proof for its members (Alcalde and Barber & agrave;, 1994). When agents may not declare potential partners inadmissible, this uniqueness result only holds for the short side, if there is one. Furthermore, among the stable mechanisms that are strategy-proof for the long side of the market, there is one that is less manipulable by coalitions of its members than the long-side optimal d...
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作者：Afacan, Mustafa Oguz; Dur, Umut; Van der Linden, Martin
作者单位：Qatar University; North Carolina State University; Emory University
摘要：We study a new variant of the school choice problem in which capacities can be altered by distributing additional seats across schools in response to students' reported preferences. We show that heuristic solutions to this capacity design problem can be inefficient, even if they focus on allocating seats to the most demanded schools. We introduce a simple class of algorithms that, in the problem where additional seats can be distributed, characterizes the set of efficient matchings among those...
