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作者：Fischer, Sabine; Grosch, Kerstin
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：This study examines the effect of agents' overconfident expectations in their production on their contract breach. Drawing on a reference-dependent framework, we theoretically deduce propositions for compliance to agreements where an agent exhibits overconfidence and loss aversion. We further conduct a lab experiment with a multiple-stage design and find that overconfident agents are more likely to breach the contract than non-overconfident agents. Moreover, overconfident agents breach more of...
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作者：Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit; Karos, Dominik; Lehrer, Ehud
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Bielefeld; Tel Aviv University
摘要：A decision maker repeatedly chooses one of a finite set of actions. In each period, the decision maker's payoff depends on a fixed basic payoff of the chosen action and the frequency with the action has been chosen in the past. We analyze optimal strategies associated with three types evaluations of infinite payoffs: discounted present value, the limit inferior, and the limit superior of the partial averages. We show that when the first two are the evaluation schemes (and discount factor is su...
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作者：Doval, Laura; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：Columbia University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study a two-sided dynamic matching market where agents arrive randomly. An arriving agent is immediately matched if agents are waiting on the other side. Otherwise, the agent decides whether to exit the market or join a queue to wait for a match. Waiting is costly: agents discount the future and incur costs while they wait. We characterize the equilibrium and socially optimal queue sizes under first-come, first-served. Depending on the model parameters, equilibrium queues can be shorter or ...
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作者：Chuan, Amanda; Zhang, Hanzhe
作者单位：Michigan State University; Michigan State University
摘要：We theoretically and experimentally investigate psychological motivations behind pay-it-forward behavior. We construct a psychological game-theoretic model that incorporates altruism, inequity aversion, and indirect reciprocity following Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). We test this model using games in which players choose to give to strangers, potentially after receiving a gift from an unrelated benefactor. Our experiment reveals that altruism an...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Muir, Ellen, V
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The ability of larger markets to mitigate the incentive problem created by private information has been the focus of a sizable economics literature. In contrast, the fact that thicker markets also reduce the double coincidence of wants problem has received little attention. Modeling thin markets as bilateral trade involving independent private values and thick markets as Walrasian markets with a continuum of traders, we analyze and quantify the matching benefits of market thickness. These bene...
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作者：Onuchic, Paula
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：An advisor discloses evidence about an object to a potential buyer, who doesn't know the object's value or the profitability of its sale (the advisor's motives). I characterize optimal disclosure rules that balance two goals: maximizing the overall probability of sale, and steering sales from lower-to higher-profitability objects. I consider the implications of a regulation that forces the advisor to always reveal her motives to the buyer. I show that whether such policies induce the advisor t...
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作者：Bei, Xiaohui; Liu, Shengxin; Lu, Xinhang
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; Harbin Institute of Technology
摘要：The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of the resources. In this paper, we propose and study a new model for fair division in which agents have their own subjective divisibility over the goods to be allocated. That is, some agents may find a good to be indivisible and get utilities only if they recei...
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作者：Walker-Jones, David
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：By weakening Shannon's original axioms to allow for attributes of the choice environment to differ in their associated learning costs, this paper provides an axiomatic foundation for Multi-Attribute Shannon Entropy, a natural multi-parameter generalization of Shannon Entropy. Sufficient conditions are also provided for a simple dataset that provides a closed-form solution for the Multi-Attribute Shannon Entropy cost function for information by analyzing stochastic choice data produced by a rat...
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作者：Boyarchenko, Svetlana; Machowska, Dominika; Topolyan, Iryna
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Warsaw; University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati
摘要：This paper takes a new look at the issue of incentive reversal in (strategic) team games, by relying on supermodularity techniques. In a setting with no contractual possibilities, we provide minimal sufficient conditions for one or both players to supply less effort in exogenously more productive environments, at the two extremal Nash equilibria. Unlike the existing literature, the analysis does not utilize concavity and other unnecessary assumptions and explicitly takes into account existence...
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作者：Choon, Thea How
作者单位：Saint Lawrence University
摘要：Do interest groups provide information in ways that systematically bias and polarize candidates? I consider a Downsian model where candidates are uncertain about the median voter's preference. Up to two interest groups, completely biased, observe voter preferences in the extremes and send costless messages to candidates. Starting with one interest group, I show all informative equilibria are asymmetric: the interest group plays favorites by revealing coarse information to one candidate, causin...
