Partial credence goods on review platforms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gradwohl, Ronen; Jelnov, Artyom
• 署名单位: University of Haifa; Ariel University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.002
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 517-534
• 关键词: Credence goods; evidence; Review platform; EFFICIENCY

摘要

We study a repeated credence goods market in which experts provide treatment to customers. We assume that the history of transactions is recorded on a review platform that contains information only about treatments, and not about non-treatments. We also introduce the notion of a partial credence good, where treated customers receive a noisy, ex post signal about the necessity of treatment. Absent such signals, there is a breakdown of the market. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the signals that guarantees the existence of any non-trivial equilibrium, as well as an efficient one.