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作者：Bich, Philippe; Fixary, Julien
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：In 1971, Wilson (1971) proved that almost all finite games have an odd number of mixed Nash equilibria. Since then, several other proofs have been given, but always for mixed extensions of finite games. In this paper, we present a new oddness theorem for large classes of polynomial payoff functions and semi -algebraic sets of strategies. Additionally, we provide some applications to recent models of games on networks such that Patacchini-Zenou's model about juvenile delinquency and conformism ...
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作者：Kruegel, Jan Philipp; Paetzel, Fabian
作者单位：TU Clausthal
摘要：Reputation systems can mitigate opportunistic behavior and improve efficiency on online marketplaces. However, rating fraud is a major problem on many websites. We experimentally investigate the circumstances under which rating fraud undermines the functioning of reputation system and reduces efficiency. We find that the ability to manipulate feedback received from others generally reduces the reliability of displayed ratings compared to a control treatment where rating fraud is not possible. ...
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作者：Barigozzi, Francesca; Cremer, Helmuth
作者单位：University of Bologna; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study how workers' concern for coworkers' ability (CfCA) affects competition in the labor market. Two firms offer nonlinear contracts to a unit mass of prospective workers. Firms may differ in their marginal productivity, while workers are heterogeneous in their ability (high or low) and their taste for being employed by any of the two firms. Workers receive a utility premium when employed by the firm hiring most high -ability workers and suffer a utility loss if hired by its competitor. Th...
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作者：Ballester, Coralio; Rodriguez-Moral, Antonio; Vorsatz, Marc
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia (UNED); Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia (UNED)
摘要：The cognitive reflection test or CRT (Frederick, 2005) has been found to be a reliable predictor of the degree of strategic sophistication of subjects in a variety of laboratory experiments. These studies have found that subjects who score higher in the CRT make choices that are closer to Nash equilibrium (i.e., Bra & ntilde;as-Garza et al., 2012). In an extended level-k k model with free subjective beliefs, we theoretically decompose the closeness to equilibrium for the class of anchored gues...
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作者：Gutin, Gregory Z.; Neary, Philip R.; Yeo, Anders
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Southern Denmark; University of Johannesburg
摘要：In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main contribution is an algorithm, based on the iterated deletion of unattractive alternatives (Balinski and Ratier, 1997; Gutin et al., 2023), that determines if and when a given list of constraints is compatible with stability. Whenever there is a stable matching t...
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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb; Chen-Zion, Ayal; Lillethun, Erik
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Colgate University
摘要：Information can be simultaneously consumed, replicated, and sold to others. We study how resale affects a decentralized market for information. Even if the initial seller is an informational monopolist, she captures non-trivial rents from at most a single buyer in any Markovian equilibrium: in the frequent-offer limit, her payoffs converge to 0 once a single buyer buys information. By contrast, there exists a non-Markovian prepay equilibrium where payment is extracted from most buyers before i...
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作者：Gallo, Oihane; Klaus, Bettina
作者单位：University of Lausanne
摘要：We consider a set of agents who have claims on an endowment that is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions but a minimal coalition size theta is required to have positive coalitional funding that is proportional to the sum of the claims of its members. We analyze the structure of stable partitions when coalition members use well-behaved rules to allocate coalitional endowments, e.g., the well-known constrained equal awards rule (CEA) or the constrained equal losses ru...
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作者：Wen, Quan; Zheng, Bingyong
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：The presence of observation errors limits players' ability to detect deviations, and hence the possibility of efficient cooperation in repeated games. When players interact repeatedly in multiple games with imperfect observation in at least one game, however, we find a novel spillover effect that enhances players' ability to sustain cooperation. This finding suggests the presence of observation error can increase the likelihood of efficient cooperation when players interact in multiple repeate...
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作者：Guo, Huiyi
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：The paper examines information structures that can guarantee full surplus extraction via collusion -proof mechanisms. Our collusion-proofness notion requires that there does not exist any coalition whose manipulation can affect the mechanism designer's payoff. When the mechanism designer is restricted to using standard Bayesian mechanisms, we show that under almost every prior distribution of agents' types, there exist payoff structures under which there is no collusionproof full surplus extra...
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作者：Goko, Hiromichi; Igarashi, Ayumi; Kawase, Yasushi; Makino, Kazuhisa; Sumita, Hanna; Tamura, Akihisa; Yokoi, Yu; Yokoo, Makoto
作者单位：Toyota Motor Corporation; University of Tokyo; Kyoto University; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology; Keio University; Kyushu University
摘要：The notion of envy -freeness is a natural and intuitive fairness requirement in resource allocation. With indivisible goods, such fair allocations are not guaranteed to exist. Classical works have avoided this issue by introducing an additional divisible resource, i.e., money. In this paper, we aim to design a truthful allocation mechanism of indivisible goods to achieve fairness and efficiency criteria with a limited amount of subsidy. Following the work of Halpern and Shah, our central quest...
