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作者：Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge; Gallo, Oihane; Vorsatz, Marc
作者单位：Universidad Publica de Navarra; Universidad Publica de Navarra; University of Lausanne; Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia (UNED)
摘要：We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result characterizes all strategy-proof rules and shows that they can be decomposed into two steps. In the first step, the agents with single-peaked preferences are asked about their peaks and, for each profile of reported peaks, at most two alternatives are preselected. In t...
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作者：Ding, Sihua; Dziubinski, Marcin; Goyal, Sanjeev
作者单位：Nankai University; University of Warsaw; University of Cambridge
摘要：A recurring theme in the study of society is the concentration of influence and power that is driven through unequal membership of groups and associations. In some instances, these bodies constitute a small world while in others they are fragmented into distinct cliques. This paper presents a new model of clubs and networks to understand the sources of individual marginalization and the origins of small and large worlds.
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作者：Roy, Sunanda; Singh, Rajesh; Weninger, Quinn
作者单位：Iowa State University
摘要：We present a model of firm entry in an industry that operates under an aggregate production quota or cap -and -trade (CAT) regulation. Firms are heterogeneous in their own productivity; each knows its costs of production but is uncertain about where its costs rank among an entrant population. We show the existence of a unique, symmetric, dominance solvable, Bayesian Nash equilibrium in switching strategies in a parameterized game with a continuum of players. Our main result is that uncertainty...
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作者：Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Rosenberg et al. (2009) studied the convergence of equilibrium behavior to consensus in social networks. In this corrigendum, we correct the condition required for one of their results to hold.
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作者：Heeger, Klaus; Cseh, Agnes
作者单位：Technical University of Berlin; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; University of Bayreuth
摘要：We consider a natural generalization of the well-known Popular Matching problem where every vertex has a weight. We call a matching M more popular than matching M ' if the weight of vertices preferring M to M ' is larger than the weight of vertices preferring M ' to M. For this case, we show that it is NP-hard to find a popular matching. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that delivers a popular matching or a proof for its non-existence in instances where all vertices on one side h...
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作者：Cheng, Yukun; Deng, Xiaotie; Li, Yuhao; Yan, Xiang
作者单位：Jiangnan University; Peking University; Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Columbia University
摘要：The BitTorrent network, a well-known Internet-scale P2P system, applies the proportional response protocol to exchange resource, where each participant contributes resource to neighbors in proportion to the amount it received in the previous round. The dynamics of this protocol is known to converge to a market equilibrium. However, an agent may manipulate this protocol by a Sybil attack to create fictitious identities and control them to gain more benefit. We apply the concept of incentive rat...
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作者：Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel; Mayskaya, Tatiana; Nikandrova, Arina
作者单位：Nevada System of Higher Education (NSHE); University of Nevada Reno; Johns Hopkins University; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); City St Georges, University of London
摘要：A rational principal delegates learning to an overconfident agent who overestimates the precision of the information he collects. The principal chooses between two contracts: commitment, in which the agent commits to the duration of learning in advance, and flexible, in which the agent decides when to stop learning in real time. When the agent is sufficiently overconfident, the principal optimally ties the agent's hands by offering him the commitment contract. When the principal can choose bot...
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作者：Chen, Bo; Chen, Bo
作者单位：Shenzhen University; Southern Methodist University; Hubei University of Economics
摘要：We study all-pay auctions with one-sided private information and interdependent valuations. To sharpen the competition and maximize revenue, the auction organizer can design an information disclosure policy through Bayesian persuasion about the bidder with private information. We characterize optimal disclosure and find that optimal disclosure exhibits almost full disclosure, where the uninformed bidder can always narrow the informed bidder's private information down to at most two types. We a...
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作者：De Vito, Nicodemo
作者单位：University of Salerno
摘要：Hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 1999) play a central role for the epistemic analysis of solution concepts in sequential games. They are modelled by type structures, which allow the analyst to represent the players' hierarchies without specifying an infinite sequence of conditional beliefs. Here, we study type structures that satisfy a richness property, called completeness. Friedenberg (2010) shows that, under specific conditions, a complete type structure with ...
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作者：Kim, Duk Gyoo; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Many-player divide-the-dollar (DD) games have been a workhorse in the theoretical and experimental analysis of multilateral bargaining. If we deal with a loss or consider many-player divide-the-penalty (DP) games, the theoretical predictions are not simply those from DD games with the sign flipped. We show that the stationary stage-undominated equilibrium (SSUE) is no longer unique in payoffs. The most egalitarian equilibrium among the stationary equilibria is a mirror image of the essentially...
