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作者：Jiao, Qian; Kuang, Zhonghong; Liu, Yiran; Yu, Yang
作者单位：Sun Yat Sen University; Renmin University of China; Tsinghua University; China University of Petroleum
摘要：This paper investigates the effort-maximizing design of multi-stage contests with tree-like architectures, focusing on both contest architecture and prize structure. Given the architecture, we show that the whole budget should be assigned to a single match. This match must be the final if the architecture is symmetric. Moreover, the winner-take-all rule proves to be optimal if the contest organizer can jointly design the architecture and prize structure. To determine the optimal contest archit...
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作者：Falvey, Rod; Lane, Tom; Luckraz, Shravan
作者单位：Bond University; Newcastle University - UK; University of Nottingham Ningbo China
摘要：We consider the class of linear voluntary contribution games under the general assumption of heterogeneous endowments. In this context, we generalize the Galbraith Mechanism (GM) and assess its performance relative to a fixed equal sharing allocation in both theory and experiments. Three main empirical results emerge. First, the GM raises average contributions significantly above those under an equal-shares allocation. Second, the GM simultaneously reduces income inequality as it improves effi...
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作者：Serizawa, Shigehiro; Weymark, John A.
作者单位：University of Osaka; Vanderbilt University
摘要：For the provision of m >= 1 divisible public goods, relatively weak restrictions on the domain of a strategy-proof social choice function are identified that ensure that its range is bounded. Domain restrictions are also identified for which strategy-proofness implies that the range and the option sets of a social choice function are compact. To illustrate the usefulness of these results, it is shown how a theorem about generalized median voter schemes due to Barber & agrave;, Mass & oacute;, ...
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作者：Galichon, A.; Jacquet, A.
作者单位：New York University; New York University; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：Matching problems with linearly transferable utility (LTU) generalize the well-studied transferable utility (TU) case by relaxing the assumption that utility is transferred one-for-one within matched pairs. We show that LTU matching problems can be reframed as nonzero-sum hide-and-seek games between two players, thus generalizing a result from von Neumann. The underlying linear programming structure of TU matching problems, however, is lost when moving to LTU. These results draw a new bridge b...
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作者：Peralta, Esteban
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper shows that, within familiar environments with transferable utilities, the set of unmatched agents is the same across all allocations that are stable in markets with one-sided incomplete information. The result does not hold in markets without transfers.
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作者：Gaunersdorfer, Andrea; Hofbauer, Josef
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Vienna
摘要：A game is unprofitable if equilibrium payoffs do not exceed the maximin payoff for each player. In an unprofitable game, Nash equilibrium play has been notoriously difficult to justify. For a class of 3x3 games we analyze whether evolutionary and learning processes lead to Nash play. We find that neither the pure Nash equilibrium nor the pure maximin strategy are stable rest points under the studied dynamics whereas the mixed Nash equilibrium and the quantal response equilibrium may be attract...
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作者：Bao, Leo; Gangadharan, Lata; Leister, C. Matthew
作者单位：Monash University; Monash University
摘要：We propose a deterrence mechanism that utilizes insider information acquired by criminals through customary practices. Under this mechanism, a suspect caught committing a criminal act can nominate a peer who has committed a similar offense, with only the more severe offender facing penalties. Theoretical analyses indicate that, under general conditions, our mechanism drives the best-response dynamic downwards compared to the commonly used regulatory practice of penalizing only the first suspec...
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作者：Maxey, Tyler
作者单位：Princeton University
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作者：Bauer, Kevin; Kosfeld, Michael; von Siemens, Ferdinand A.
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We study, theoretically and empirically, the effect of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce social goods in the presence of positive effort complementarities. Theory predicts that lowering incentives increases social-good production via the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents into low-incentive work environments. We test this prediction in a novel lab experiment that allows us to isolate the effect of self-selection cleanly. Results s...
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作者：Athanasoglou, Stergios; Bonkoungou, Somouaoga; Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：University of Milano-Bicocca; University of Lausanne; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Consider a setting in which individual strict preferences need to be aggregated into a social strict preference relation. For two alternatives and an odd number of agents, it follows from May's Theorem that the majority aggregation rule is the only one satisfying anonymity, neutrality and strategy-proofness (SP). For more than two alternatives, anonymity and neutrality are incompatible for many problem instances and we explore this tradeoff for strategy-proof rules. The notion of SP that we em...
