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作者：Biro, Peter; Csaji, Gergely
作者单位：Corvinus University Budapest; Eotvos Lorand University
摘要：We study strong core and Pareto-optimal solutions for multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains from a computational point of view. The restriction to the two-sided case is called stable many -to -many matching problem and the general one-sided case is called stable fixtures problem. We provide an example to show that the strong core can be empty even for many -to -many problems, and that deciding the non -emptiness of the strong core is NP -hard. On the positiv...
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作者：Dolgopolov, Arthur
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：I characterize the outcomes of a class of model -free reinforcement learning algorithms, such as stateless Q -learning, in a prisoner's dilemma. The behavior is studied in the limit as players stop experimenting after sufficiently exploring their options. A closed form relationship between the learning rate and game payoffs reveals whether the players will learn to cooperate or defect. The findings have implications for algorithmic collusion and also apply to asymmetric learners with different...
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作者：Manili, Julien
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper provides a sufficient monotonicity condition for the solution of a rationalizability procedure to be independent of the order of elimination. The analysis unfolds in an abstract environment that applies to any game and elimination procedure. Monotonicity is satisfied by rationalizability procedures based on monotone belief operators, such as directed rationalizability, interim correlated rationalizability, or, in sequential games, initial and backwards rationalizability.
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作者：Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo; Romero-Medina, Antonio
作者单位：Complutense University of Madrid; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We consider school choice problems where school priorities depend on transferable student characteristics. Fair Pareto improvements can alleviate the trade-off between efficiency and stability in this framework. A group of students may improve their outcomes by exchanging their seats and transferable characteristics at the schools they are initially assigned without generating justified envy among the remaining students.We define the student exchange with transferable characteristics (SETC) cl...
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作者：Minardi, Stefania; Savochkin, Andrei
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Bocconi University
摘要：A consumption event is memorable if the memory of the event affects well-being at times after the material consumption, as originally introduced by Gilboa et al. (2016). Our main contribution is to develop an axiomatic foundation of memorable consumption in a dynamic setting. Preferences are represented by the present value of the sum of utilities derived at each date from the current consumption and from recollecting the past. Our model accommodates well-known phenomena in psychology, such as...
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作者：Kuang, Zhonghong; Zhao, Hangcheng; Zheng, Jie
作者单位：Renmin University of China; University of Pennsylvania; Shandong University
摘要：Two privately informed contestants compete in a contest, and the organizer ex-ante designs a public anonymous disclosure policy to maximize the contestants' total effort. We fully characterize ridge distributions, under which the organizer achieves the first-best outcome in equilibrium: the allocation is efficient, and the entire surplus goes to the organizer. When the prior is a mixture of a ridge distribution and a perfectly correlated distribution, the first-best outcome is achievable by a ...
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作者：Mankat, Fabian
作者单位：Universitat Kassel
摘要：This paper studies how a continuum of individuals interacting in a binary public goods game can secure cooperation through transmitting and enforcing norms. The evolutionary model consists of three distinct dimensions: behavior, norms, and approval preferences. In line with the indirect approach proposed by G & uuml;th and Yaari (1992), behavior results from utility maximization, while norms and approval preferences evolve over time. The underlying evolutionary processes differ concerning spee...
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作者：Werner, Peter
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：This study investigates how the exogenous provision of norm information concerning wage inequality influences the acceptance of wage differences. In an experiment where one employer interacts with two employees who differ in productivities, two main treatments provide information suggesting either an injunctive norm for small or for large wage differences prior to the interaction. Norm-relevant information significantly shifts individual beliefs concerning the appropriateness of wage inequalit...
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作者：Niu, Yingjie; Zou, Zhentao
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Wuhan University
摘要：We develop a continuous-time dynamic multi-agent contracting model in which the principal is unsure about the distributions of the project's terminal payoffs and worries about model misspecification. With model uncertainty, workers' wages depend on the outputs of other unrelated projects and the optimal contracts exhibit overdetermination. We demonstrate an inverse U-shaped relationship between the extent of overdetermination and group size. Moreover, model uncertainty induces wage compression...
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作者：Casajus, Andre; Funaki, Yukihiko; Huettner, Frank
作者单位：HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management; Waseda University; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：The Shapley value equals a player's contribution to the potential of a game. The potential is a most natural one-number summary of a game, which can be computed as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition of the players. This computation integrates the coalition formation of all players and readily extends to games with externalities. We investigate those potential functions for games with externalities that can be computed this way. It turns out that the potential that corresponds...
