Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sirguiado, Camilo J.; Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo
• 署名单位: Universidad de Chile
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.005
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 385-397
• 关键词: Matching markets; Outside options; strategy-proofness; STABILITY

摘要

In two-sided one-to-one matching markets, each side of the market has a single stable mechanism that is strategy-proof for its members (Alcalde and Barber & agrave;, 1994). When agents may not declare potential partners inadmissible, this uniqueness result only holds for the short side, if there is one. Furthermore, among the stable mechanisms that are strategy-proof for the long side of the market, there is one that is less manipulable by coalitions of its members than the long-side optimal deferred acceptance mechanism. In general, Alcalde and Barber & agrave;'s uniqueness result holds for one side of the market if and only if either at most one of its members may not declare inadmissibilities or there are fewer agents on that side than individuals without outside options on the other side of the market.