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作者：Song, Yangbo
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：I study information aggregation among opinion leaders, who have access to private information, observe their predecessor's move, and care about both taking a correct action and maximizing the measure of followers. Potential followers are uninformed agents who care solely about the truth and choose to agree with either the current opinion leader or their predecessor. I find that the distinct incentive of an opinion leader to disagree with their predecessor, although encouraging every individual...
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作者：Demange, Gabrielle
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：Communication between individuals often involves two types of dual activities. On social media such as Facebook, for example, users produce content (posts) and pay attention to their friends' posts. These activities are dual as a user is more inclined to produce posts the more friends react to them and is more inclined to dedicate attention to a friend's posts the more numerous these posts are. This paper builds and analyzes a simple game with dual activities and dedicated attention when agent...
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作者：Xiong, Yifan; Li, Guopeng; Lang, Youze
作者单位：Anhui Normal University; Huazhong University of Science & Technology; Fudan University
摘要：This paper investigates how a monopolist strategically acquires information from networked consumers with correlated preferences using discriminatory or uniform pricing schemes. Under uniform pricing, the optimal information acquisition problem can be efficiently solved in polynomial time by iteratively selecting consumers with the highest Katz-Bonacich centrality. By contrast, under discriminatory pricing, the problem is generally NP-hard. However, in typical networks, such as complete bipart...
