Stability vs. no justified envy
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Romm, Assaf; Roth, Alvin E.; Shorrer, Ran I.
署名单位：
Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Stanford University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002
发表日期：
2024
页码：
357-366
关键词：
摘要：
Stability and no justified envy are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility constraints, and contracts, and show that stable allocations may admit justified envy. When choice functions are substitutable, the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is both stable and admits no justified envy.
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