Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On Rationalizability in games with private values

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: De Magistris, Enrico
• 署名单位: Cornerstone Research
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.003
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 126-140
• 关键词: Game theory; rationalizability; incomplete preferences; incomplete information

摘要

I propose a notion of Rationalizability, called Incomplete Preference Rationalizability, for games with incomplete preferences. Under an appropriate topological condition, the incomplete preference rationalizable set is non -empty and compact. I argue that incomplete orderings can be used to model incomplete information in strategic settings. Drawing on this connection, I show that in games with private values the sets of incomplete preference rationalizable actions, of belief -free rationalizable actions (Battigalli et al., 2011; Bergemann and Morris, 2017), and of interim correlated rationalizable actions (Dekel et al., 2007) of the universal type space coincide.