Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Bonifacio, Agustin G.
• 署名单位: Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Universidad Nacional de San Luis
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.002
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 12-24
• 关键词: Obvious manipulations; Tops-onliness; Voting by committees; Voting by quota

摘要

In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. First, we show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent vetoes an alternative it can do so with any preference that does not have such alternative in the top. Second, we focus on two classes of tops-only rules: (i) (generalized) median voter schemes, and (ii) voting by committees. For each class, we identify which rules do not have obvious manipulations on the universal domain of preferences.