Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Haimanko, Ori
• 署名单位: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.007
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 222-233
• 关键词: All-pay auctions; incomplete information; Behavioral strategies; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Interdependent types

摘要

We prove the existence of a behavioral -strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all -pay auctions with statistically interdependent types (signals) under quite general assumptions on the values, costs and tie -breaking rules. Moreover, the set of equilibria is shown to be the same for any tie -breaking rule used in the auction.