Taking turns

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Leo, Greg
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.003
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 525-547
• 关键词: Taking turns; mechanism design; ex post incentive compatibility; repeated games

摘要

Two individuals face a regular task that requires the effort of only one. They take turns but sometimes arrange to swap obligations. These swaps account for their changing, private costs. While seemingly primitive, flexible turn-taking is surprisingly efficient, even relative to what can be achieved by mechanisms using monetary transfers. I model and experimentally evaluate a simple form of flexible turn-taking and then present a second form that is both consistent with patterns of subject behavior and approximately second-best in a benchmark case. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.