Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boosey, Luke; Brookins, Philip; Ryvkin, Dmitry
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.008
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 212-229
• 关键词: Contest; Group size uncertainty; experiment; Overbidding; probability weighting; Joy of winning; Constant winning aspirations

摘要

In many contest situations, the number of participants is not observable at the time of investment. We design a laboratory experiment to study individual behavior in Tullock (lottery) contests with group size uncertainty. There is a fixed pool of n potential players, each with independent probability q is an element of (0, 1] of participating. We independently manipulate each of the parameters and test the implied comparative statics predictions. Our results provide considerable support for the theory, both in terms of comparative statics and point predictions. Most surprisingly, we find no evidence of overbidding in treatments where there is a nontrivial probability that group size is one. This stands in stark contrast to the robust overbidding observed in experimental contests with deterministic group size. We propose a one-parameter model that incorporates nonlinear probability weighting and a modified version of joy of winning, which we call Constant Winning Aspirations (CWA), and show that it neatly organizes all of our results. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.