Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ben-Zwi, Oren
• 署名单位: University of Haifa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.013
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 456-467
• 关键词: Ascending auctions; characterization; Gross substitute; Walrasian

摘要

We introduce a novel characterization of all Walrasian price vectors in terms of over- and under demanded sets for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. For ascending and descending auctions we suggest a universal framework for finding the minimum or maximum Walrasian price vectors for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. An ascending (descending) auction is guaranteed to find the minimum (maximum) Walrasian if and only if it follows the suggested framework. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.