Implementation under ambiguity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Castro, Luciano I.; Liu, Zhiwei; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
• 署名单位: University of Iowa; Capital University of Economics & Business
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.010
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 20-33
• 关键词: Maximin preferences; Maximin efficient allocations; Maximin equilibrium; implementation

摘要

We introduce the idea of implementation under ambiguity. In particular, we study maximin efficient notions for an ambiguous asymmetric information economy (i.e., economies where agents' preferences are maximin a to Wald, 1950). The interest on the maximin preferences lies in the fact that maximin efficient allocations are always incentive compatible (de Castro and Yannelis, 2009), a result which is false with Bayesian preferences. A noncooperative notion called maximin equilibrium is introduced which provides a noncooperative foundation for individually rational and maximin efficient notions. Specifically, we show that given any arbitrary individually rational and ex -ante maximin efficient allocation, there is a direct revelation mechanism that yields the efficient allocation as its unique maximin equilibrium outcome. Thus, an incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient outcome can be reached by means of noncooperative behavior under ambiguity. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.