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作者：Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma
作者单位：Kansai University; Ryukoku University
摘要：We consider house (re)allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We are concerned with the possibility that a pair of agents may gain by swapping their endowments before the operation of the chosen rule. A rule is called endowments swapping-proof if it is immune to this kind of manipulation. Our main result is that the top trading cycles rule is the only rule that satisfies individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and endowments-swapping-proofness. (C) 2018 Elsev...
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作者：Chen, Yan; Jiang, Ming; Kesten, Onur; Robin, Stephane; Zhu, Min
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University; Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Carnegie Mellon University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Beijing Normal University
摘要：We compare the performance of the Boston Immediate Acceptance (IA) and Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanisms in a laboratory setting where we increase the number of participants per match. In our experiment, we first increase the number of students per match from 4 to 40; when we do so, participant truth-telling increases under DA but decreases under IA, leading to a decrease in efficiency under both mechanisms. Furthermore, we find that DA remains more stable than IA, regardless of...
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作者：Agranov, Marina; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Princeton University
摘要：We study the extent to which communication can serve as a collusion device in one-shot first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions. In an array of laboratory experiments we vary the amount of interactions (communication and/or transfers without commitment) available to bidders. We find that communication alone leads to statistically significant but limited price drops. When, in addition, bidders can exchange transfers, revenues decline substantially, with over 70% of our experimental auctions ...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Kamada, Yuichiro
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Many models of learning in games implicitly or explicitly assume there are many agents in the role of each player. In principle this allows different agents in the same player role to have different beliefs and play differently, and this is known to occur in laboratory experiments. To explore the impact of this heterogeneity, along with the idea that subjects use their information about other players' payoffs, we define rationalizable partition confirmed equilibrium (RPCE). We provide several ...
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作者：Hwang, Ilwoo
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：I study a dynamic one-sided-offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under incomplete information. The seller knows the quality of his product, while the buyer does not. During bargaining, the seller may receive an outside option, the value of which depends on the quality of the product. If the outside option is sufficiently important, there is an equilibrium in which the buyer's belief about the product's quality stays constant and she continues to make the same randomized offer th...
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作者：Smith, Vernon L.; Wilson, Bart J.
作者单位：Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：An exceptionally robust result in experimental economics is the failure to observe equilibrium (subgame perfect) play in the ultimatum game. A heretofore unnoticed feature of the game is that neither player voluntarily chooses to play. Motivated by Adam Smith's proposition that beneficence like that of non-equilibrium play in the ultimatum game cannot be extorted by force, we offer the responder the opportunity to opt out of the game for a mere $1 payoff for both players. We observe far higher...
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作者：Mauleon, Ana; Roehl, Nils; Vannetelbosch, Vincent
作者单位：University Saint-Louis - Bruxelles; University of Paderborn
摘要：We develop a general theoretical framework that allows us to study the group structures that are going to emerge at equilibrium in overlapping coalition settings. We introduce the notion of constitution in order to model for each group the rules governing both the composition of the group and the conditions needed to leave the group and/or to become a new member of the group. We propose the concept of constitutional stability to study the group structures that are going to emerge at equilibriu...
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作者：Leucci, Stefano; Mamageishvili, Akaki; Penna, Paolo
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：This work gives the first natural non-utilitarian problems for which the trivial n approximation via VCG mechanisms is the best possible. That is, no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate, where n is the number of agents. The problems we study are the min-max variant of the shortest path and the (directed) minimum spanning tree mechanism design problems. In these procurement auctions, agents own the edges of a network, and the corresponding edge costs are private. Instead of the ...
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作者：Macho-Stadler, Ines; Perez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We propose the average approach, where the worth of a coalition is a weighted average of its worth for different partitions of the players' set, as a unifying method to extend values for characteristic function form games. Our method allows us to extend the equal division value, the equal surplus value, the consensus value, the lambda-egalitarian Shapley value, and the family of least-square values. For each of the first three extensions, we also provide an axiomatic characterization of a part...
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作者：Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：This paper presents a new solution concept for multiplayer stochastic games, namely, acceptable strategy profiles. For each player i and state s in a stochastic game, let w(i)(s) be a real number. A strategy profile is w-acceptable, where w = (w(i)(s)), if the discounted payoff to each player i at every initial state s is at least w(i)(s), provided the discount factor of the players is sufficiently close to 1. Our goal is to provide simple strategy profiles that are w-acceptable for payoff vec...
