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作者：Boncinelli, Leonardo; Pin, Paolo
作者单位：University of Florence; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We provide a perturbed evolutionary model of matching on a graph. First, we obtain that maximal matchings are the singleton recurrent classes of the model without perturbations. Then, we apply stochastic stability analysis considering two different error models: the link-error model, where mistakes directly hit links, and the agent-error model, where mistakes hit agents' decisions, and indirectly links. We find that stochastic stability is ineffective for refinement purposes in the link-error ...
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作者：Karos, Dominik; Peters, Hans
作者单位：Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：We axiomatically develop a class of power indices for effectivity functions, both for the case where the set of alternatives is finite and where it is infinite. Such power indices make it possible to take the issues under consideration into account, in contrast to power indices defined just for simple games. As an example, we consider the US legislative system. We also show that our approach can be used to develop power indices for spatial political games. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights res...
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作者：Mu'alem, Ahuva; Schapira, Michael
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：This paper presents inapproximability results for paradigmatic multi-dimensional truthful mechanism design problems. We first show a lower bound of 2 - 1/n for the scheduling problem with n unrelated machines (formulated as a mechanism design problem in the seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen on Algorithmic Mechanism Design). Our lower bound applies to universally-truthful randomized mechanisms, regardless of any computational assumptions on the running time of these mechanisms. Moreover, it hold...
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作者：Perea, Andres
作者单位：Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：Battigalli (1997) has shown that in dynamic games with perfect information and without relevant ties, the forward induction concept of extensive-form rationalizability yields the backward induction outcome. In this paper we provide a new proof for this remarkable result, based on four steps. We first show that extensive-form rationalizability can be characterized by the iterated application of a special reduction operator, the strong belief reduction operator. We next prove that this operator ...
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作者：Chatterji, Shurojit; Zeng, Huaxia
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study the standard voting model with randomization. A Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF) satisfies the tops-only property if the social lottery under each preference profile depends only on the peaks of voters' preferences. We identify a general condition on domains of preferences (the Interior Property and the Exterior Property) which ensures that every strategy-proof RSCF satisfying unanimity has the tops-only property. We show that our condition applies to important classes of votin...
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作者：de Oliveira, Henrique
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This paper gives a simple proof of Blackwell's theorem on the ranking of information structures. The proof extends naturally to environments where information arrives over time (leading to the notion of adapted garbling) and environments where information is diffused among multiple players (leading to the notion of independent garbling). (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Eguia, Jon X.; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Morton, Rebecca; Nicolo, Antonio
作者单位：Michigan State University; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of Padua; University of Manchester
摘要：Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive, symmetric or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes no restrictions on beliefs: we select the action profile that is supported in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs. We conduct an experiment to compare the predictive power of the existing and our novel selection c...
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作者：Mishra, Debasis; Nath, Swaprava; Roy, Souvik
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：In private values quasi-linear environment, we consider problems where allocation decisions along multiple components have to be made. Every agent has additively separable valuation over the components. We show that every unanimous and dominant strategy implementable allocation rule in this problem is a component-wise weighted utilitarian rule, which assigns non-negative weight vectors to agents in each component and chooses an alternative in each component by maximizing the weighted sum of va...
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作者：Casajus, Andre; Huettner, Frank
作者单位：HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management; European School of Management & Technology
摘要：We suggest foundations for the Shapley value and for the naive solution, which assigns to any player the difference between the worth of the grand coalition and its worth after this player left the game. To this end, we introduce the decomposition of solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility. A decomposer of a solution is another solution that splits the former into a direct part and an indirect part. While the direct part (the decomposer) measures a player's contribution in a ...
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作者：Jagadeesan, Ravi
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：In finite two-sided matching markets, the Lone Wolf Theorem guarantees that the same set of agents remains unmatched in all stable outcomes. I show by example that this assertion is not true in infinite, discrete markets. However, despite the fact that the Lone Wolf Theorem is often used to derive strategy-proofness, the deferred acceptance mechanism remains (group) strategy-proof in many infinite markets. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
