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作者：Kwiek, Maksymilian
作者单位：University of Southampton
摘要：Simple majority does not reflect the intensity of voters' preferences. This paper presents an efficient collective choice mechanism with two alternatives when the designer may use non-transferable punishments to persuade agents to reveal their private information. The designer faces a dilemma - a punishment may induce a more correct choice, but its cost is socially wasteful. The efficient mechanism is a weighted majority. Weight of each individual is known ex ante and no punishments are applie...
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作者：Neyman, Abraham
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We study continuous-time stochastic games, with a focus on the existence of their equilibria that are insensitive to a small imprecision in the specification of players' evaluations of streams of payoffs. We show that the stationary, namely, time-independent, discounting game has a stationary equilibrium and that the discounting game and the more general game with time-separable payoffs have an epsilon equilibrium that is an epsilon equilibrium in all games with a sufficiently small perturbati...
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作者：Klein, Arnd Heinrich; Schmutzler, Armin
作者单位：University of Zurich; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper analyzes two-stage rank-order tournaments. To influence efforts in the two periods, a principal can use the intertemporal prize structure and the weight of first-period performance in the second-period prize. These two instruments implement different sets of effort vectors. We characterize the optimal combination of prizes and weights as a function of parameters. For large parameter regions, the principal should only give a second-period prize, but use positive first-period performa...
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作者：Peleg, Bezalel; Peters, Hans
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Maastricht University
摘要：We show that feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) can be used to select k from m alternatives. An important advantage of this method is the core property: no coalition can guarantee an outcome that is preferred by all its members. We also show that the problem of determining whether a specific k-tuple can result from a feasible elimination procedure is computationally equivalent to the problem of finding a maximal matching in a bipartite graph. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserv...
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作者：Bouton, Laurent; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Malherbe, Frederic
作者单位：Georgetown University; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of London; London Business School; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of subject behavior. Finally, we exploit a framing effect to study how the presence of less sophisticated agents affects Veto's welfare properties. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：McMurray, Joseph
作者单位：Brigham Young University
摘要：In this spatial model of common-value elections, votes convey citizens' private opinions regarding which policies are socially optimal, and the winning candidate utilizes this information in choosing policy. In equilibrium, large margins of victory convey mandates for candidates to make bold policy changes. To communicate extreme policy views, citizens support extreme parties that may be unlikely to win office. To convey moderate views, citizens deliberately abstain from voting, thereby avoidi...
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作者：Ewerhart, Christian
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：This paper considers all-pay contests in which the relationship between bids and allocations reflects a small amount of noise. Prior work had focused on one particular equilibrium. However, there may be other equilibria. To address this issue, we introduce a new and intuitive measure for the proximity to the all-pay auction. This allows, in particular, to provide simple conditions under which actually any equilibrium of the contest is both payoff equivalent and revenue equivalent to the unique...
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作者：Haefner, Samuel
作者单位：University of Basel
摘要：This paper analyzes a tug-of-war contest between two teams. In each round of the tug-of-war, a pair of agents from the opposing teams competes in a private value all-pay auction with asymmetric value distributions and effort effectiveness. Whichever team arrives first at a given lead in terms of battle victories over the opponent wins the tug-of-war. There exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium in bidding strategies which depend on the respective player's valuation and the current state of...
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作者：Gneezy, Uri; Gravert, Christina; Saccardo, Silvia; Tausch, Franziska
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Amsterdam; University of Gothenburg; Carnegie Mellon University; Max Planck Society
摘要：We examine under what conditions people provide accurate feedback to others. We use feedback regarding attractiveness, a trait people care about, and for which objective information is hard to obtain. Our results show that people avoid giving accurate face-to-face feedback to less attractive individuals, even if lying in this context comes at a monetary cost to both the person who gives the feedback and the receiver. A substantial increase of these costs does not increase the accuracy of feedb...
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作者：Sobel, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Consider a finite two-player game with one round of communication. Restrict players to a subset of monotonic strategies. The paper justifies this restriction. The paper provides sufficient conditions under which the strategies of the restricted game that survive iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies favor the agent who can communicate. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
