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作者：Baucells, Manel; Samet, Dov
作者单位：University of Virginia; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider a group of individuals, such that each coalition of them is endowed with a preference relation, which may be incomplete, over a given set of prospects, and such that the extended Pareto rule holds. We assume that each singleton coalition has complete vNM preferences. In this setup, Baucells and Shapley (2008) gave a sufficient condition for a coalition to have complete preferences, in terms of the completeness of preferences of certain pairs of individuals. The new property that we...
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作者：Cao, Zhigang; Qin, Chengzhong; Yang, Xiaoguang
作者单位：Beijing Jiaotong University; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Chinese Academy of Sciences; Academy of Mathematics & System Sciences, CAS
摘要：Shapley (1955) introduced the model of an abstract market game as a generalization of the assignment game model, among several other models. He conjectured that abstract market games possess non-empty cores. We analyze properties of abstract market games and provide a proof of this conjecture for cases with four or fewer players. We show by example that, in general, the structure of an abstract market game is not strong enough to guarantee the nonemptiness of the core. We establish supplementa...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Frug, Alexander
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Aarhus University; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We propose a model of bilateral trade in which private information about the quality of an asset can be acquired only gradually over time. An asset is characterized by a vector of binary i.i.d. attributes, and its worth to a player is equal to a weighted sum of the attributes' values (where weights differ across players). The seller is initially uninformed about the attributes' values, and each period he decides whether to make a price offer or to costlessly inspect an attribute's value. The b...
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作者：Bonanno, Giacomo; Tsakas, Elias
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; Maastricht University
摘要：We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Borgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom wher...
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作者：Grant, Simon; Kline, J. Jude; Quiggin, John
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Queensland
摘要：We introduce linguistic ambiguity into a principal-agent contracting framework. Contracts are drafted in a common language. Nevertheless, the principal and the agent may ultimately disagree about the terms of the contract that apply ex post. We presume that both parties are ambiguity averse and for tractability reasons that their preferences take a recursive constant absolute risk averse (RCARA) form. We consider various dispute resolution regimes and analyze how the optimal dispute resolution...
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作者：Hellman, Ziv; Schreiber, Amnon
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：We characterise two new orders of desirability of gambles (risky assets) that are natural extensions of the stochastic dominance order to complete orders, based on choosing optimal proportions of gambles. These orders are represented by indices, which we term the S index and the G index, that are characterised axiomatically and by wealth and utility uniform dominance concepts. The S index can be viewed as a generalised Sharpe ratio, and the G index can be used for maximising the growth path of...
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy
摘要：The paper shows that Shapley's axiomatic characterization of his value can be strengthened considerably. Indeed, his additivity axiom can be replaced by a simple accounting property whereby a player's payoff is the difference of a reward based on the worth of coalitions to which she belongs, and a tax based on the worth of coalition to which she does not belong, without placing any restriction whatsoever on the functional relationship between the reward or the tax and the worths that determine...
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作者：Haimanko, Ori
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：I introduce a new axiom for power indices on the domain of finite simple games that requires the total power of any given pair i. j of players in any given game v to be equivalent to some individual power, i.e., equal to the power of some single player k in some game w. I show that the Banzhaf power index is uniquely characterized by this new equivalence to individual power axiom in conjunction with the standard semivalue axioms: transfer (which is the version of additivity adapted for simple ...
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作者：Skibski, Oskar; Michalak, Tomasz R.; Wooldridge, Michael
作者单位：University of Warsaw; University of Oxford
摘要：A long debated but still open question in the game theory literature is that of how to extend the Shapley Value to coalitional games with externalities. While previous work predominantly focused on developing alternative axiomatizations, in this article we propose a novel approach which centers around the coalition formation process and the underlying probability distribution from which a suitable axiomatization naturally follows. Specifically, we view coalition formation in games with externa...
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作者：Aguiar, Victor H.; Pongou, Roland; Tondji, Jean-Baptiste
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Ottawa; University of Texas System; University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
摘要：The unique properties of the Shapley value-efficiency, equal treatment of identical input factors, and marginality-have made it an appealing solution concept in various classes of problems. It is however recognized that the pay schemes utilized in many real-life situations generally depart from this value. We propose a non-parametric approach to testing the empirical content of this concept with limited datasets. We introduce the Shapley distance, which, for a fixed monotone transferable-utili...
